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STATE-ENFORCED FEES FOR SPECIAL BENEFITS
CONFERRED: TAXES OR USER FEES?
Coy v. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan,
595 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1992)
Sharon Liebman*
Licensed physicians filed an action challenging the constitutionality of
Florida Statutes section 766.314.1 The statute established the financing
scheme for the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Plan (the Plan).2 The Plan provided no-fault insurance to obstetricians by
requiring all licensed physicians to contribute an annual fee.3 Petitioners,
physicians not practicing obstetrics, argued that the statute violated equal
protection and due process guarantees.4 Specifically, petitioners asserted

that the statute singled out physicians to pay insurance costs, yet nonobstetricians derived no greater benefit from the Plan than the general
public.' Respondents defended the statute as a valid exercise of taxing
power.6 The trial court and the First District Court of Appeal rejected
petitioners' claims.' The lower court held that the fees were valid taxes
because requiring all physicians to contribute was rationally related to the
Plan's goals.' The Supreme Court of Florida granted certiorari,9 and
*

Special thanks to Professor David M. Hudson for his assistance with this case comment.

1. Coy v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, 595 So. 2d 943, 944
(Fla. 1992), af'g McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, 564 So.
2d 177 (Fla. Ist DCA 1990), cert. denied sub nom., McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan, 113 S. Ct. 194 (1992).
2. FLA. STAT. § 766.314 (1989).
3. Id. § 766.314(4)(b), (5)(a). All licensed physicians pay a mandatory annual fee of $250. Id.
Obstetricians choosing to join the Plan pay an annual fee of $5000 and receive insurance coverage. Id.
§ (4)(c), (5)(a). The Department of Insurance may increase the fees to maintain the Plan on an
actuarially sound basis. Id. § (7)(b). Petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the Department's authority
as an invalid delegation of legislative taxing power. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 947.
4. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 944-45.
5. Id. at 944.
6. See id. at 945.
7. McGibony, 564 So. 2d at 178.
8. Id. at 179. The trial court focused on two of the Plan's goals: ensuring the availability of
obstetrical services and providing compensation for children with birth-related injuries. Coy, 595 So.
2d at 945. The trial court found that a rational basis for the classification existed because all physicians, not only obstetricians, would receive benefits if the Plan achieved its goals. Id. at 945-46. Although the obstetricians more clearly bore a rational relation to the goals, because they could provide
obstetrical services and receive direct benefits from insurance coverage, the trial court identified benefits conferred which evidenced the rational relation between non-obstetricians and the fees supporting
the Plan. See id. On appeal, the petitioners argued that the benefits, the lower court's evidence of
rational relation, were too tenuous to justify the tax. Id. at 945.
9. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 944.
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Florida law
HELD, the fee levied on licensed physicians was a tax under
0
statutes.'
taxing
to
applicable
and met the legal requirements
The Florida Supreme Court defined a "tax" in State ex rel. Clark v.
Henderson." In Henderson, a school taxing district sought to collect fees
it had levied on respondent's homestead.' The Florida Constitution exempted homesteads from taxation. 3 Respondent asserted that the school
district fees were taxes and, as such, were unconstitutional and uncollectible. 4 The respondent prevailed. 5
In analyzing the nature of the school district fees, the court distinguished taxes from other state-enforced pecuniary burdens. 6 The court
noted that the constitution differentiates between the two pecuniary burdens by exempting homesteads "from all taxation, except for assessments
for special benefits."' 7 The majority then defined a "tax" as an enforced
pecuniary burden levied by the state to support the government's proper
functions.' The constitution mandated that the state provide a public
school system and specifically granted school districts the taxing power."
Thus, the court found that providing a public school system was a proper
state function, and school district fees supported that system." The court
concluded that the school district fees were, in fact, taxes."
The court recognized that both taxes and special assessments are stateenforced pecuniary burdens.2 However, the court noted that the two
charges are inherently different and governed by different principles. 3 A
special assessment is a fee levied on property owners who receive a specific benefit from a government-provided improvement.24 Governmental
entities generally levy special assessments against real property; the benefit conferred on the payor is an enhancement in property value.' By con-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 945.
188 So. 351, 354 (Fla. 1939).
Id. at 352.
Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7 (1934).
See Henderson, 188 So. at 352.
Id. at 354, 355.
Id. at 354.
Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7 (1938)).
Id. (citing Klemm v. Davenport, 129 So. 904, 907 (Fla. 1930)).
Id. at 352; see FLA. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1,10 (1938).
Henderson, 188 So. at 354.

21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Klemm, 129 So. at 907).
24. Id.
25. See id. The dissent argued that the constitution's drafters did not intend to confine the term
"assessments for special benefits" to the real property context. Id. at 355 (Buford, J., dissenting). The
dissent further argued that the special benefit took the form of free public schools in the tax district,

not higher property values. Id. The dissent reasoned that because the homestead exemption applies
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trast, a tax's validity does not depend upon specific, quantifiable benefits
running to the taxpayer.' The school district fees were taxes which supported a proper governmental function and not special assessments that
reflected the value of specific benefits conferred on a property."
The Florida Supreme Court again considered the distinction between
special assessments and taxes in City of Naples v. Moon.' In Moon, the

plaintif

9

argued that the parking authority, a governmental entity, levied

charges against his property which violated standards applicable to both
taxes and special assessments." The court held that the charges constituted valid special assessments.31
The legislature granted the city parking authority power to levy charges to fund public parking lots.32 In analyzing the nature of the charges,
the court focused on the rate-setting mechanism.33 Property owners benefitting from the parking lots paid the charges.'M Although property value
was one factor in the rate-setting mechanism,35 the key factor was the
value of the benefit conferred by the parking lots.3" The court concluded
that the benefits-conferred payment scheme was the hallmark of a special
assessment, not a tax. 37 Thus, the charges were not subject to tax stan-

only to taxes, and the school district fee is an "assessment for special benefits," homesteads should not
be exempted from the school district fee. See id.
26. See id. at 354 (citing Klemm, 129 So. at 907).
27. Id. at 353.
28. 269 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1972).
29. Moon was the plaintiff in the trial court and respondent in the direct appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court. Id. at 356.
30. Id. Different standards govern taxes and special assessments. See id. Thus, the court had to
determine the nature of the charge before it could apply proper constitutional validity standards. See
id. The Florida Constitution required that taxes, not special assessments, be applied uniformly and
according to authorized millage rates. Id.; see FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 9 (1972). Unlike taxes, no such
requirement exists for special assessments. Moon, 269 So. 2d at 356. However, discemable guidelines
must exist to measure benefits conferred on property owners through special assessments. Id.
31. Moon, 269 So. 2d at 358-59.
32. Id. at 357.
33. See id. at 358. The court looked beyond the legislation's literal wording. See id. The stated
purpose of the legislation was to levy an ad valorem tax. Id. However, the legislature used the terms
"tax" and "assessment" interchangeably. Id. The amounts of the charges were to be proportional to the
value of benefits conferred. Id. The categorization did not depend on the literal label the taxing authority applied. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The plaintiff argued that the property value factor evidenced an ad valorem tax. See id. If
the parking authority based the change solely on property value, then the change arguably could not be
a special assessment. Id. The amount of the charge would not properly reflect the value of the benefit
conferred if property value was the sole rate-setting factor. See id.
36. Id. The property was in a business district. Id. at 356. The parking lots conferred benefits on
property owners by providing customers easy access to businesses in the district, thereby increasing
business revenues. See id. at 356, 359.
37. See id. at 358.
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dards35 Furthermore, the charges were valid special assessments because
discernable guidelines existed to measure the value of the benefits conferred.39
Through special assessments and user fees, the legislature can require
that citizens pay for the beneficial use of government improvements, facilities, or services. The term "special assessment" generally refers to fees
levied for increased property values resulting from government-provided
improvements. 4' The property owner necessarily receives a benefit; thus,
the owner is effectively the "user" of the improvement. 4' Additionally,
government-provided services or facilities often confer benefits which are
not tied to real property values.4" The term "user fee" generally refers to
fees levied in return for use of a service or facility. 43 The use translates
into a benefit to the user.' Thus, special assessments and user fees both
represent payment for beneficial "use" of facilities or services.45
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality
of a user fee in Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-ManateeAirport
Authority.' Alamo, an off-airport car rental company, benefitted from the
state-provided airport by using it to access customers. 47 The airport authority levied fees on Alamo in return for airport-provided access to travelers.4" Alamo challenged the fees, claiming that they violated the commerce clause. 49 The court concluded that the fees were valid user fees.5
In analyzing whether the fees contravened the commerce clause, the
38. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39. Moon, 269 So. 2d at 358-59.
40. See, e.g., State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 354 (Fla. 1939).
41. Cf. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 906 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.
1990) (concluding that enjoyment of benefits conferred constitutes use), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1073
(1992).
42. See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707,
714 (1972) (ruling that Delta Airlines' use of public airport runways and other services conferred
business benefits for which Delta paid a user fee).
43. See id.; Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518.
44. See, e.g., Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518.
45. Compare Moon, 269 So. 2d at 358 (characterizing and analyzing special assessments by
determining whether payments fairly represent benefits conferred) with Alamo, 906 F.2d at 519 (characterizing and analyzing user fees by determining whether payments fairly represent benefits conferred).
46. 906 F.2d 526, 518 (11th Cir. 1990).
47. Id. at 519.
48. Id. at 517. On-airport car companies automatically had access to travelers because their businesses were on airport grounds. See id. In return for access, off-airport companies paid 10% of gross
receipts obtained from airport customers. Id.
49. Id. Alamo appealed the district court's ruling that the fee did not violate due process or the
commerce clause. Id. at 518. The airport authority classified the charges as user fees, so the court
automatically applied a user fee analysis. Id. at 518 n.1. Thus, the court did not categorize the charges,
but it did note the difference between user fees and taxes in its commerce clause analysis. Id.
50. Id. at 523.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss2/8

4

Liebman: State-Enforced Fees for Special Benefits Conferred: Taxes or User
CASE COMMENTS

court noted the contrasting standards for analyzing taxes and user fees."1
Taxes and user fees both provide revenue to the collecting entity.52 However, user fees provide specific benefits to the user, while taxes support
public purposes. 3 The airport provided a direct connection to potential
customers; thus, Alamo received specific benefits through increased revenue.' At a minimum, Alamo used the entire airport indirectly because it
benefitted from the mere presence of the facility." Thus, Alamo's "use"
of the airport was its enjoyment of airport-generated business. 6
The court recognized that different standards govern user fees and
taxes. 7 Because user fees represent payment for specific benefits, the
collecting entity must prove that the fee amount fairly approximates the
value of the benefit conferred.5" The court does not demand this factual
showing when justifying a tax. 9 Thus, categorizing a charge as a user fee
or a tax determines the correct standard to apply and is essential in analyzing a charge's validity.'
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court categorized the fee
levied on licensed physicians as a tax.6 The court found that the state
levied the fee to support a government enterprise-a state-created insurance plan-and that the state could sue to enforce the fee.62 Thus, the fee
met the tax definition established in Henderson63 and was subject to the
legal standards of a tax.64 The court then determined that it should apply
the rational basis test to measure the tax's validity.65 The rational basis

51. Id. at 518.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620-23 (1981)).
54. See id. at 519.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 518; cf State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 354 (Fla. 1939) (stating that
different principles govern taxes and special assessments).
58. Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518 (citing Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 599 (1939)); see also
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 717 (1972) (requiring a factual showing that user fees fairly approximate the value of use).
59. See Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518.
60. See id.
61. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945.
62. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 766.314(6)(b)(1) (1989) (stating that the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, administrator of the Plan, may sue to enforce payment).
63. Henderson, 188 So. at 354 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7 (1938)).
64. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945. The analysis of the fee's nature was brief. Id. The court did not
mention alternative categories, and Henderson was the sole authority the majority cited to support its
categorization. Id. The minority opinion also classified the charge as a tax, but concluded that the tax
was invalid. Id. at 948-49 (Kogan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 945 (concluding that physicians were not a suspect class, so the rational basis test for
nonsuspect taxing statutes should be applied to determine whether the statute violated equal protection
guarantees); see De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989)
(defining a suspect class as one which has traditionally been the target of unfair discrimination); see
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test offers the legislature great freedom in exercising its taxing power and
allows the court to presume tax classifications are valid.' Thus, the fee
imposed on physicians is valid under the rational basis test if the assessment on all physicians as a class bears any conceivable, rational relation to
the "tax."'67 After determining the applicable test, the court considered
legislative intent and trial court findings to ascertain whether the legislature had a rational basis to require that all physicians fund the Plan.'
The Plan was a legislative response to the medical malpractice crisis.69 The legislature intended to ensure the availability of obstetrical services by stabilizing and reducing malpractice insurance premiums for
obstetricians." The legislature chose to accomplish this by establishing
the Plan, a no-fault compensation system for birth-related malpractice
claims.7 Obstetricians could join the Plan for five thousand dollars per
year72 or could "opt-out"73 and pay the two hundred and fifty dollar annual fee levied on all licensed physicians.74 In effect, by paying the annual fee, non-obstetricians subsidized a plan which provided insurance only
to obstetricians. Petitioners argued that non-obstetricians received no
greater benefit from the Plan than did the general public,76 and thus, the
legislature had irrationally singled them out to fund the Plan.' Petitioners
asserted that the annual fee was not rationally related to ensuring the

also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 1984) (establishing
minimum scrutiny for taxing statutes), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
66. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945 (quoting Eastern, 455 So. 2d at 314).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 945-47. In analyzing whether a state taxing statute containing state residency distinctions violated equal protection guarantees, the Supreme Court established a question that courts
should affirmatively answer in finding rational basis for a classification. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981). The question was: Was it reasonable for the
lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote the statute's purpose? Id.
The relevant question in the instant case should have been whether taxing physicians as a class would
promote the Plan's purposes. Although the instant court did address this question, see Coy, 595 So. 2d
at 946, the court focused on whether non-obstetricians would receive a heightened benefit if the Plan
achieved its purposes. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 766.301 (1989) (setting forth legislative findings and intent).
70. Id. § 766.301(1)(c). The legislative findings indicated that insurance premiums for obstetricians were higher than those for other physicians. Id. § (1)(a). The findings also stated that obstetricians were among the most severely affected by the malpractice crisis. Id. § (1)(b).
71. Id. § (2). The legislature concluded that it had to act to stabilize premiums for obstetricians
because obstetrical services were essential. Id. § (1)(c). The high premiums had threatened the availability of obstetricians within the state. See id.: Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946.
72. FLA. STAT. § 766.314(4)(c) (1988).
73. See id. The evidence at trial indicated that only 535 obstetricians opted to join the Plan in
1989, while 27,922 physicians paid the mandatory annual fee of $250. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 944-45.
74. FLA. STAT. § 766.314(4)(b) (1988).
75. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 944.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 944-45; supra note 8.
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availability of obstetrical services-the purpose of the Plan.78
The court rejected petitioner's arguments, finding that all physicians
were related to the broader purpose of the Plan-alleviating the medical
malpractice crisis. 9 The court relied on trial court findings that all hospital physicians work as a team and depend on one another; thus, a breakdown in obstetrics has repercussions throughout the entire health care
industry. 0 Consequently, the majority reasoned that an improvement in
obstetrics benefits the entire health care industry."
The court reasoned that the Plan would provide benefits to all physicians by alleviating the medical malpractice crisis and improving the
health care industry.82 The majority concluded that the annual assessment
charged to all physicians was rationally related to the Plan's goals." The
court found that the benefit conferred upon those physicians served as
evidence of the rational relation." The' court did not attempt to quantify
the benefit conferred, but noted that the difference between the
obstetrician's fee and the non-obstetrician's fee reflected a legislative
attempt to value the benefits.s According to the court, the participating
obstetricians paid significantly more because they received greater benefits.,6
Three dissenting justices agreed that the fees were taxes, but argued
that the Plan did not offer physicians sufficient direct benefits to justify
the tax.87 Thus, both the majority and dissent focused on the nature and
amount of benefits the Plan conferred on physicians. 8 The majority concluded that the indirect beneficial effects in the health care industry justi-

78. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945-47.
79. Id. at 946-47. The dissent defined the purpose of the Plan narrowly and argued that no reasonable relation existed between all physicians and the Plan's ultimate purpose of ensuring obstetrical

care. Id. at 948 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 945-47.
81. Id. at 946-47. The court assumed all physicians were necessarily affected by inefficient hospital operations. See id. The court did not distinguish between those physicians who routinely worked in
or with hospitals and those that did not. See id. If efficient teamwork in hospital practice was the
benefit, physicians not routinely working in hospitals would not receive the benefit.
82. Id. at 946.

83. Id. at 945.
84. Id. at 946; cf.Alamo, 906 F.2d at 519 (concluding that enjoyment of benefits conferred constituted use and supported a user fee's validity).
85. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 947.
86. Id. The court did not make a distinction between the nature of the obstetrician's fee and the
non-obstetrician's fee. Id. It follows that the court would also label the obstetrician's insurance premium ($5000 per year) a "tax." See id.; supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
87. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 948-49 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to the dissent, the tax was invalid because non-obstetricians did not receive a quid pro quo. Id. at
949. However, a tax's validity does not depend upon specific benefits running to the taxpayer in return
for payment. See supra text accompanying note 26.
88. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946, 948-49.
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fied a tax on all physicians." However, the dissent concluded that the
link between9 the tax and alleged indirect benefits to non-obstetricians was
too tenuous. 0
Both the majority and dissent used benefits-conferred principles to
analyze the tax's validity. However, the Henderson, Moon, and Alamo
courts previously concluded that these principles did not goyern taxes. 9
Those courts found that enforced pecuniary burdens for specific government-provided services were not taxes, but were special assessments or
user fees. 92 Similarly, the physician's fee is not a tax merely because it
was an enforced pecuniary burden levied by the state.93 The court should
have looked beyond the literal tax definition because a charge which superficially satisfies the definition might still be governed by different
principles.94 The court made no attempt to contrast the physician's fee
with alternate types of charges to determine its true nature.95
The fee in the instant case superficially satisfied the tax definition in
Henderson.96 However, the court's analysis presented a funding scheme
that paralleled a payment for benefits-conferred scheme, not a taxing
scheme. 97 The court found that the "tax" was valid because it represented
the value of specific benefits conferred on physicians.98 In reaching this

89. Id. at 946.
90. Id. at 948-49.
91. Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518 (applying different standards to user fees, which provide specific
benefits to the user, and taxes); Moon, 269 So. 2d at 358 (characterizing fees for special benefits conferred to property owners as special assessments, not taxes); Henderson, 188 So. at 354 (stating that
different principles govern taxes and special assessments and that special assessments are payments for
special benefits conferred).
92. See cases cited supra note 91. The benefits-conferred principles applied in these cases parallel
one another. See cases cited supra note 91.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
95. See supra note 64.
96. See supra text accompanying note 18. The no-fault insurance plan is a state-provided service
and arguably satisfies a valid state purpose. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976)
(stating that because the state's police power extends to the area of public health and welfare, a legislative act intended to curtail the medical malpractice crisis is a valid exercise of police power), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). But see Chicago & E. R.R. v. Keith, 65 N.E. 1020, 1024 (Ohio 1902)
(stating that taxing to redress private wrongs where the benefit to the public is only incidental is an
invalid taxing purpose). Thus, levying fees to provide compensation to tort plaintiffs injured by a
physician's negligence would be an invalid exercise of taxing power. See id.
97. See supra text accompanying note 37; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609, 622-23 (1981) ("A tax is not an assessment of benefits."); City of Boca Raton v. Florida,
595 So. 2d 25, 29 (Fla. 1992). In Boca Raton, the court held that "a legally imposed special assessment is not a tax. Taxes and special assessments are distinguishable in that, while both are mandatory,
there is no requirement that taxes provide any specific benefit to the property .... " 595 So. 2d at 29.
Ironically, the Florida Supreme Court decided Boca Raton, id. at 25, just two weeks after the instant
case. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 943.
98. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 947.
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finding, the court focused on the existence of the benefit conferred to
prove a rational relation." If the success of the Plan were to provide a
specific benefit to physicians, then the fee would represent payment for
the value of that benefit."' In light of Henderson, Moon, and Alamo, the
instant court should have applied user fee principles," not a hybrid of
lenient scrutiny applicable to taxing statutes'. 2 and benefits-conferred

principles applicable to user fees.

3

The instant court's analysis paralleled the Alamo analysis" 4 by focusing on the physicians' "use" of benefits which the Plan provided. 5
In Alamo, the car rental company argued that it did not use the airport, but
only used the airport roads."re However, the Alamo court found that Alamo used the airport indirectly by receiving benefits in the form of in-

creased business revenue." °e Similarly, non-obstetricians in the instant
case argued that they did not "use" the Plan.0 8 However, the instant
court, like the Alamo court, found that all physicians indirectly used the
Plan1 by receiving benefits"° from a more efficient health care industry. 10

99. See i. at 945-47. The court's focus on benefits conferred to establish a rational relation did
not conform to the Supreme Court's scheme for establishing a rational relation between classifications
and statutory purposes. See supra note 68. The Supreme Court's standard focuses on how the classification would promote a specific purpose. See supra note 68. Under the Supreme Court's standard, the
instant court's focus should have been on what physicians as a class could offer to ensure the availability of obstetrical services. See supra note 68. However, the instant court focused on what physicians would receive from the Plan instead of what physicians could offer to promote the Plan's purposes. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945-47.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86; supra note 91.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 (showing that the term "user fee," not "special
assessment," would be proper in the instant case because the Plan does not relate to real property).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
106. Alamo, 906 F.2d at 519.
107. Id.
108. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 944-45. The obstetricians who chose to join the Plan would clearly
"use" the Plan by receiving insurance coverage. Id. at 944: see FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301(2), .312(4)(c)
(1988).
109. See Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946-47; see also Alamo, 906 F.2d at 519 (noting that enjoyment of
benefits conferred constitutes use).
110. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946. The argument that the general public would "use" the Plan because it
would provide public benefit necessarily follows. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 109. Under
this analysis, the general public should pay an amount representing the value of the public benefit. But
see Stephen Diamond, ConstitutionalLimits on the Growth of Special Assessments, 6 URB. L. &
POL'Y 311, 314 (1984) (stating that special assessments are infrequently rejected because governments
demand contributions from only a segment of the total class of beneficiaries and that courts give much
deference to legislative determinations of the extent of benefits). Thus, the court might not invalidate
the physician's fee simply because the public received some benefit for which the state did not require
payment. See id.
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The instant court departed from the Alamo analysis after implicitly
applying the Alamo court's "use" definition. The Alamo court required that
the airport authority prove the value of the benefit conferred,"' but the
instant court simply concluded that physicians would receive a benefit." 2
The court did not require proof of the alleged benefits or proof of their
value." 3 Instead, the majority created a chain of inferences leading to
industry-wide benefits." 4 This chain of inferences may satisfy the rational relation test applicable to taxing statutes," 5 but it is insufficient to satisfy the more stringent proof-of-benefit guidelines for user fees." 6 By
classifying the fee as a tax, the court utilized a presumption of validity,' thereby allowing the government to avoid the burden of proving
benefit value.
The instant court incorrectly applied classic user fee principles while
incorrectly labeling the fee a "tax." The court's focus on the presumed
value of the private benefit conferred on physicians was inconsistent with
the definition of a tax. The court found that the physicians' fee compensated the state for providing a specific benefit to physiciansY" However,
taxes provide general revenues to the government to support public purposes." 9 The Plan's broad goal-that of alleviating the medical malpractice crisis-fulfilled a public purpose. 2 ° However, according to the ma2
jority, this general goal also provided a special benefit to physicians.' '

111. Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518-19.
112. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946. The majority cites trial court and legislative findings in support of its
conclusions. Id. at 946-47.
113. Id. at 946. The Association might have proven benefit value by presenting the Department of
Insurance's actuarial investigation of the Plan's operations during 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. The
statute requires periodic actuarial investigations. FLA. STAT. § 766.314(7)(a), (8) (1988).
114. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945-46.
115. Id. at 945.
116. See Alamo, 906 F.2d at 518 (requiring the airport authority to factually prove that the user
fees fairly approximate the benefits conferred); see also Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. at 717 (requiring a
factual showing that user fees fairly approximate the value of use); Moon, 269 So. 2d at 358 (stating
that discernable guidelines must exist to measure the benefit conferred by a special assessment). But
cf. City of Gainesville v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 411 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (presuming, in the case of a special assessment, the validity of the government's factual showing of benefits conferred on the payor, overcome only by strong, direct, clear, and positive proof).
117. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945; see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622
(1981) (noting that the Supreme Court gives considerable latitude to the states to impose general revenue taxes).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
119. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622-23. Society is "established and safeguarded
by the devotion of taxes to public purposes." Id. at 623.
120. See supra note 96.
121. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946-47. The majority reasoned that physicians would benefit more than
the general public if the Plan achieved its broad goal, alleviating the crisis. Id. The heightened benefit
proved the rational relation. Id. The more specific goals of the Plan, compensating injured babies and
providing insurance to obstetricians, could not justify the fee because those goals did not relate to all
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The court identified the Plan's goals-reduction of malpractice claims
and stabilization of the health care industry-as both fulfilling a public
purpose and conferring special benefits on physicians." If achieving the
goals would provide heightened benefits which would justify the selective
fee, then the fee effectively would be a payment for special benefits." If
the public goal took on a private flavor, the fee would not, by definition,
be a tax. 24 The physicians' enjoyment of special benefits conferred constituted "use" of the Plan,"z and the fee would be a user fee.
The majority opinion did not evince careful consideration of the fee's
true nature. The court categorized the fee as a tax,'26 yet it incorrectly
applied user fee principles in its analysis. 27 Classifying the fee as a tax
allowed the court to presume its validity"= and dispense with proof-ofbenefit calculations.'29 If the court justified the selective fee as payment
for special benefits conferred, then the fee would not be a tax, 3 the statute would not be presumptively valid,' and the court correctly could
have scrutinized proof of alleged benefits.'32 The instant case set poor
precedent by applying a tax-like standard to selective fees justified by private benefits, not the public benefits characteristic of a tax. This lenient
standard of review will provide little protection to those individuals whom
the legislature singles out to pay fees.

physicians. Id. at 948 (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. See id. at 945.
123. See Jacksonville Port Auth., Inc. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (lst
DCA), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992). The issue in this case was whether an airport authority's
charge constituted a user fee or a tax. Id. The court stated that "the fee is not a general revenue source
[or a tax] for the support of a sovereign government. Instead, it is governed by entirely different principles based on receipt of a special benefit ....
Id. at 1164.
124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
126. See supra text accompanying note 61.
127. See supra text accompanying note 116.
128. See supra text accompanying note 66.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
131. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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